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List-rationalizable choice
Kemal Yildiz
Department of Economics, Bilkent University
A choice function is list rational(izable) if there is a fixed list such that for each
choice set, successive comparison of the alternatives by following the list retrieves
the chosen alternative. We extend the formulation of list rationality to stochastic
choice setup. We say two alternatives are related if the stochastic path indepen-
dence condition is violated between these alternatives. We show that a random
choice function is list rational if and only if this relation is acyclic. Our charac-
terization for deterministic choice functions follows as a corollary. By using this
characterization, we relate list rationality to two-stage choice procedures.




We analyze a boundedly rational choice procedure that we call list-rational(izable)
choice. A list-rational decision maker chooses from a set of alternatives as follows. First,
he orders the alternatives according to a list. Then he compares the first and second
alternatives in the list and records the winner, which is then compared to the next alter-
native. This process of carrying the current winner to the next round continues until the
last alternative in the list is compared to the winner from the previous round. The win-
ner of the last round is regarded as the choice made from the entire set. A list-rational
decision maker orders the entire set of alternatives according to a single list, and follows
the restriction of this list to make a choice from each subset.
To motivate list rationality, consider a decision maker who learns the details of each
alternative sequentially. Suppose that this decision maker is unable to recall all the
encountered alternatives, but has a single memory cell used to store an alternative to
choose whenever the process is interrupted. For such a decision maker, list rationality
is a natural procedure. The decision maker orders the alternatives in the form of a list
and stores the first alternative in his memory cell. Then whenever he is faced with a new
alternative, he decides whether to keep the stored alternative or to replace it with the
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new one. In the same vein, Salant (2003) argues that list rationality is the unique choice
procedure that uses a single memory cell.
The experimental literature also discusses why decision makers adopt procedures
similar to list rationality. For example, Shugan (1980) proposes a formulation based
on cost of thinking, and argues that the lowest choice cost would be achieved by first
choosing from among a pair of alternatives with low thinking cost and then comparing
the chosen alternative to the next. Similarly, Russo and Rosen (1975) argue that decision
makers follow list rationality1 to minimize the short-term memory load.2 In a rather
recent study, Liu and Simonson (2005) argue that decision makers guided through list-
rational choice procedure are more confident in their choices compared to nonguided
decision makers.3
In this paper, we formally model and analyze the list-rational choice procedure. The
idea that list-following behavior can be modeled as a choice procedure is not new. Salant
and Rubinstein (2006) analyze a choice model in which decision makers choose from
lists, rather than from choice sets. Put differently, the list is assumed to be exogenous
and is considered as a frame (Salant and Rubinstein 2008) for the associated choice
problem. In contrast, our list-rational decision maker chooses from choice sets in a way
that the choice behavior is driven by a list that is unobserved by outsiders. To model the
list as a subjective part of the choice procedure is of interest, since even if alternatives
are exogenously presented in a particular order, due to other cognitive limitations, a de-
cision maker can follow a different virtual ordering. For example, a decision maker can
start the comparison from an alternative that he considers as a reference point (Tversky
and Kahneman 1991), can group similar items together (Russo and Rosen 1975), or can
form the list to minimize the total cost of thinking (Shugan 1980).
In our analysis, we provide choice theoretical foundations for list rationality both
in deterministic and stochastic choice setups. To characterize list rationality, the main
task is to identify the unobserved list followed by the decision maker from his observed
choice behavior. We can identify the unobserved list if we can infer that an alterna-
tive unambiguously follows4 another alternative in the decision maker’s considerations.
Consider the stochastic choice setup in which the decision maker’s choice reveals a
probability measure over each choice set. In this setting, we say an alternative x is
revealed-to-follow another alternative y if there is a choice set S that contains x but not
1List rationality is referred to as standard revision and is described on page 267 of Russo and Rosen
(1975).
2See Russo and Rosen (1975, p. 272).
3Subjects are asked to make a choice from a set of 10 products according to two procedures. In the
first procedure, subjects were presented all 10 product offers together and asked to indicate the one they
are most interested in. Then they were asked whether they wanted to buy the selected product. In the
second procedure, subjects were asked to make a choice from the same set of 10 products according to
list rationality by following an exogenously specified list. Once the last item in the list was considered,
participants were asked to decide whether they wanted to buy the selected product. The authors observed
that the subjects in the latter treatment are more likely to buy their selected product (45%) than those in
the former treatment (34%).
4That is, for a given pair of alternatives, in each list that is consistent with the observed choice behavior,
the first one follows the second.
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y, such that the choice probability of x from S ∪ {y} is different than the choice prob-
ability of x from S multiplied by the choice probability of x when compared to y. We
show that a decision maker is list rational if and only if the revealed-to-follow relation is
acyclic.5 As a corollary, we obtain the characterization for the deterministic case. More-
over, the revealed-to-follow relation induces all possible lists that are consistent with the
observed choices of the decision maker.
Finally, we relate list rationality to two-stage choice procedures analyzed extensively
in the literature.6 In particular, we consider the shortlisting procedure (Manzini and
Mariotti 2007, Au and Kawai 2011). We provide characterizations of shortlisting and
list rationality based on the acyclicity of an underlying binary relation. We believe
that comparing these two binary relations facilitates comparisons between these choice
procedures.
1.1 Relation to the literature
Our model belongs to the growing body of research in boundedly rational choice theory.
This literature seeks to explain choice behavior that cannot be explained by the maxi-
mization of a single preference relation. In most of these models, a choice procedure
is proposed that contains not only the decision maker’s (welfare) preference, but also a
behavior pattern for using this preference. Several of these models are consistent with a
well known choice anomaly, having binary choice cycles.7 Since a list-rational decision
maker can compare pairs of alternatives in any arbitrary way, he can exhibit any binary
choice cycle. Compared with these models, the set of list-rational choice functions is
nested by the set of choice functions analyzed by Xu and Zhou (2007), Apesteguia and
Ballester (2013), Masatlioglu et al. (2012), and is nonnested with the set of choice func-
tions analyzed by Manzini and Mariotti (2007, 2012) and Cherepanov et al. (2013).
Horan (2011) analyzes an extension of choice by game trees (Xu and Zhou 2007) in
which players choose actions by using binary relations that can be intransitive. A par-
ticular case of this model8 is observationally equivalent to list rationality, and a differ-
ent characterization of list rationality in the deterministic choice setup follows from the
general characterization provided in this paper. This characterization is built on a par-
titional weakening of path independence based on choices from three-element sets. In
contrast, both in deterministic and stochastic choice setups, we derive our characteri-
zation and identification results from our revealed-to-follow relation.
Apesteguia et al. (2014) axiomatically characterize equilibrium choices of two
agenda-voting institutions in which the agenda to be followed is unobservable. Among
these, the amendment (Anglo–American) procedure is behaviorally similar to list ra-
tionality. The main difference is that while a choice function is defined only over all
5That is, for each set of alternatives {x1     xn}, if for each i ∈ {1     n− 1}, xi is revealed-to-follow xi+1,
then we cannot have xn revealed-to-follow x1.
6For example, Manzini and Mariotti (2007), Lleras et al. (2010), Tyson (2008), and Manzini et al. (2013).
7That is, an alternative x is chosen when compared to another alternative y , and y is chosen when com-
pared to a third alternative z, but z is chosen when compared to x. For experimental findings, see Tversky
(1969), Loomes et al. (1991).
8Similar to our Example 2.
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possible subsets of alternatives, a voting rule is additionally defined over the prefer-
ences of the voters. Salant and Rubinstein (2006) and Salant (2011) discuss variants of
list-rational choice procedure as examples when lists are observable. Apesteguia and
Ballester (2013) investigate choice functions that are sequentially rationalizable and
show that list-rational choice functions belong to this family.
2. The model and examples
2.1 List-rational choice
Given a finite alternative set X , any nonempty subset S is called a choice set. Let 
denote the collection of all choice sets. A choice function c specifies the observed choice
c(S) from the choice set S; that is, a choice function c :  → X such that for each S ∈ ,
c(S) ∈ S.
A list-rational choice procedure has two primitives: a list and an asymmetric binary
relation used to compare pairs of alternatives. A list f is an ordering—a complete, tran-
sitive, and antisymmetric binary relation—on X such that for each x y ∈ X , we write
x f y if and only if x follows y in the considerations of the decision maker. A list-rational
decision maker who orders the alternatives according to f, chooses from a choice set as
follows: First, he compares the first and second alternatives. Then he compares the cur-
rent choice to the third alternative in the list. This process of carrying the current choice
to the next round continues until the end of the list is reached. In the final round, the
decision maker chooses between the choice from the previous round and the last alter-
native. This final binary choice determines the alternative chosen from the entire set.
Next, to get a formal description of this procedure, we provide a recursive formulation
for list rationality.
Definition 1. A choice function c is list-rational if there exists a list f such that for each
S ∈, if x is the last alternative in S according to f, then
c(S) = c({c(S \ x)x})
We illustrate list-rational choice behavior by presenting two choice procedures. Al-
though these procedures have different formulations, we argue that each can be repre-
sented as a list-rational choice procedure.
Example 1 (Rational choice). The decision maker has a preference relation 9 over the
alternative set, and chooses the -best alternative from each choice set. Since  is tran-
sitive, for any list f followed by the decision maker, from each choice set S, the same
alternative, max(S), is chosen. ♦
Example 2 (Choice by a binary game tree). The primitive of this choice procedure is
an extensive form game G in which there are two players and a binary game tree such
that each alternative appears as an end node of the tree only once. Each player has a
9A complete, transitive, and antisymmetric binary relation.
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preference relation over the alternative set.10 At each decision node, players successively
decide whether to stop or to continue as to maximize their preferences. Choosing to stop
directly leads to one of the terminal nodes in which the associated alternative is chosen.
For each choice set S, consider the reduced game G|S derived from G by retaining only
the paths that lead to terminal nodes having outcomes in S. From each choice set S, the
decision maker chooses the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium outcome of the reduced
game G|S. Each choice function that can be rationalized via such an extensive form
game is list-rational. To see this, list the alternatives according to the reverse order of
appearance in the game tree. Next, note that for each choice set, the alternative that
is chosen according to Definition 1 is the one that is obtained by applying backward
induction. Hence the equivalence follows. ♦
2.2 List-rational random choice
Instead of observing a decision maker’s choice from each set only once, suppose that we
observe repeated choice behavior of the decision maker. Suppose the decision maker
does not always choose the same alternative from each set, but his choice rather re-
veals consistent frequencies. For each choice set S and alternative x, let Cx(S) be the
frequency with which the decision maker chooses x from the set S. Thus, we obtain a
random choice function (r.c.f.) C that assigns each choice set S a probability measure
over S.
List-rational random choice procedure has two primitives: a deterministic list and
a random binary relation used to compare pairs of alternatives. The list f followed by a
list-rational decision maker is deterministic and, as before, gives an ordering of the alter-
natives. However, the decision maker’s binary comparisons can be random. In contrast,
Salant and Rubinstein (2006) formulate a general model in which the list can be ran-
dom. As they put it, if the list is exogenously given in the description of a choice prob-
lem, then it may be natural to consider an underlying random process that transforms
sets into lists. However, we consider the list as a subjective part of the choice procedure.
Moreover, for list rationality, if the comparison between two alternatives is determinis-
tic, then among them the same alternative is chosen irrespective of the followed list. We
find this property particularly restrictive for random choice functions. However, as an
extension of random utility models (Block and Marschak 1960), one can think of a model
in which both the list and the binary comparisons are random. Next, we formulate the
list-rational random choice procedure.
Definition 2. An r.c.f. C is list-rational if there exists a list f such that for each S ∈, if




Cz(S \ x) ·Cx(xz) (1)
10Each player can be interpreted as a different self of a single decision maker that concentrates on a
particular aspect of the alternative set.
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and for each y ∈ S \ x,
Cy(S) = Cy(S \ x) ·Cy(x y) (2)
A deterministic choice function can be thought of as a random choice function such
that from each choice set an alternative is chosen with probability 1. For deterministic
choice functions, the above formulation boils down to the list-rational choice proce-
dure. To see this, suppose x is the last alternative in choice set S according to list f and z
is chosen from S \ x. If x is chosen from S, then it follows from (1) that Cx(xz) = 1; thus
x = c(c(S \ x)x). If another alternative y is chosen from S, then it follows from (2) that
z = y and Cy(x y) = 1; thus y = c(c(S \ x)x).
A random choice function satisfies (strong) monotonicity if the choice probability
of an existing alternative necessarily decreases in response to the addition of a new al-
ternative. Most of the random choice models examined in the literature, such as the
Luce rule (Luce 1959), satisfy monotonicity. A list-rational decision maker may violate
monotonicity since list-following choice behavior exhibits a recency effect 11 as our next
example illustrates.
Example 3. Let X = {x1x2 y}. Suppose that x1 and x2 are similar alternatives, for ex-
ample, different recordings of the same Beethoven symphony, while y is a distinct alter-
native, for example, a Debussy suite. Suppose between any pair of these three recordings
the decision maker chooses with equal probabilities. Now, it seems natural to choose
from the set {x1x2 y} with probabilities 025, 025, and 05, respectively.12
Suppose our list-rational decision maker follows the list f where y f x2 f x1. Now, x1
wins the comparison to x2 with 05 probability. If this is the case, then x1 is compared to
y, and x1 wins this comparison with another 05 probability. Hence, x1 is chosen from
the entire set with 025 probability. Similarly, x2 is chosen with 025 probability. Since
y beats the winner of the previous round regardless of whether it is x1 or x2 with 05
probability, y is chosen with 05 probability. Hence, we obtain Cx1(S) = Cx2(S) = 025,
and Cy(S) = 05. ♦
3. Results
First, we provide a characterization of list rationality in the stochastic choice setup. The
characterization for the deterministic setup follows as a corollary. To characterize list
rationality, the main task is to identify when we can conclude that x unambiguously fol-
lows y in the considerations of a list-rational decision maker from the random choice
11A recency effect emerges when people consider the last alternative in a list as more favorable than the
others. Evidence for the recency effect has been found in contests where competitors are evaluated one
after another; for example, see Bruine de Bruin (2006) and Glejser and Heyndels (2001).
12Debreu (1960) proposes this example to highlight a shortcoming of the well known Luce rule. This
probability assignment is incompatible with the Luce rule, since the existence of two very similar items
outweighs the total choice probability of these items. This phenomenon is later referred to as the duplicates
effect. Although list-rational random choice fails to accommodate the general duplicates effect, for Debreu’s
example, we observe that the natural choice behavior can be retrieved by following a particular list. See, for
example, Gul et al. (2014) for a model that accommodates the general duplicates effect.
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data. To define the revealed-to-follow relation that paves the way to this end, first we
formulate a stochastic version of the path independence condition (Plott 1973) for deter-
ministic choice functions.13
Stochastic Path Independence (SPI): An r.c.f. C satisfies SPI if for each S ∈ such that
x ∈ S and y /∈ S,
Cx(S ∪ y)= Cx(S) ·Cx(x y)
Equivalently, C satisfies SPI if for each S ∈  and each S1 S2 ⊂ S such that S1 ∪ S2 = S
and S1 ∩ S2 = {x}, we have Cx(S) = Cx(S1) ·Cx(S2).
Definition 3. For a given r.c.f. C and for each distinct x y ∈ X , x is revealed-to-follow
y, denoted by x fC y, if SPI is violated between x and y, i.e., for some S ∈  such that x ∈ S
and y /∈ S, we have
Cx(S ∪ y) = Cx(S) ·Cx(x y)
Proposition 1. An r.c.f. C is list-rational if and only if fC is acyclic. Moreover, the iden-
tified list is unique up to the completions of the transitive closure of fC .
Proof. Only-if part : Suppose C is a list-rational r.c.f. described by f. We will show that
fC is acyclic. To see this, first we show that for each x y ∈ X , if x fC y, then x f y. We
proceed by contradiction and suppose that y f x. Since x fC y, SPI should be violated
between x and y. We will obtain the contradiction by showing that this is impossible.
For each S ∈  such that x ∈ S and y /∈ S, let S′ = S ∪ {y}. If y is the last alternative in S′
according to f, then by (2) of the list-rationality definition, we get Cx(S′) = Cx(S′ \ y) ·
Cx(x y). It directly follows that SPI holds between x and y.
Next, suppose y is the last but one alternative in S′ according to f. Let z be the last
alternative in S′. By (2) we have Cx(S′) = Cx(S′ \ z) ·Cx(xz). Now consider the set S′ \ z.
Since y is the last alternative in this set, by (2) we have Cx(S′ \z) = Cx(S′ \{z y}) ·Cx(x y).
Now substitute Cx(S′ \ z) in the previous equation. Next consider the set S′ \ {y}. Since
z is the last alternative in this set, by (2) we have Cx(S′ \ y) = Cx(S′ \ {z y}) · Cx(xz). It
follows that Cx(S′)= Cx(S′ \ y) ·Cx(x y); thus SPI holds between x and y. By proceeding
similarly, one can show that SPI holds between x and y as far as y follows x in S′. So far
we have shown that if x fC y, then x f y. Since f is transitive, it follows that fC is acyclic.
If part : Given an r.c.f. C consider the relation fC . Denote the transitive closure of fC
by Tr(fC). Since fC is acyclic, Tr(fC) is asymmetric. Let f be any completion of Tr(fC).
Note that f is an ordering on X .
In the rest of the proof we show that f rationalizes the given C. To see this, consider
any S ∈ . Suppose x is the last alternative in S according to f. Next, we show that
conditions (1) and (2) from Definition 2 hold. First, note that since x is the last element
in the list, for each y ∈ S \ x, x f y. Since f nests fC and x f y, we cannot have y fC x. It
follows that SPI holds between y and x.
13Kalai and Megiddo (1980) formulates and analyzes a similar stochastic path independence condition.
Manzini and Mariotti (2014) induce a similar condition from more primitive choice axioms.
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(1) Note that we can simply write Cx(S) = 1 −∑y∈S\x Cy(S). Since SPI holds between
each y ∈ S \ x and x, we have Cy(S) = Cy(S \ x) · (1 −Cx(x y)). Once we substitute these
expressions into the former, we obtain (1).
(2) Consider any y ∈ S \ x. Since SPI holds between y and x, Cy(S) = Cy(S \ x) ·
Cy(x y). Hence we conclude that f rationalizes C. 
Definition 4. For a given choice function c and for each distinct x y ∈X , x is revealed-
to-follow y, denoted by x Fc y, if for some S ∈, we have either
(i) x = c(S ∪ y) and [y = c(x y) or x = c(S)] or
(ii) x = c(S ∪ y) and [x= c(x y) and x= c(S)].
Corollary 1. A choice function c is list-rational if and only if Fc is acyclic. Moreover, the
identified list is unique up to the completions of the transitive closure of Fc .
Proof. As noted above, any choice function can be thought of as an r.c.f. C such that
for each S ∈  and x ∈ S, Cx(S) ∈ {01}. Next, note that once the fC relation is written
for a choice function c, we obtain the Fc relation. Hence, the conclusion directly follows
from Proposition 1. 
4. List rationality and two-stage choice procedures
In this section, we relate list rationality to two-stage choice procedures. We consider the
two-stage procedure, referred to as shortlisting, in which the decision maker has two
binary relations defined over the alternative set such that the first relation P1 is transi-
tive but possibly incomplete, and the second relation P2 is a preference relation. Given
a choice set, the decision maker first commits to the set of undominated alternatives
with respect to the first relation. Then from this set he chooses the best alternative ac-
cording to the second relation. From each choice set S, shortlisting singles out the al-
ternative max(max(SP1)P2). Shortlisting is more restrictive than the rational shortlist
method (Manzini and Mariotti 2007) in which both binary relations are only required to
be asymmetric.14
One can easily check that the set of choice functions that can be represented as
shortlisting and the set of list-rational choice functions are nonnested. In Example 2,
we argue that list rationality can be equivalently formulated in the language of choice
by game trees. Similarly, in the next example we introduce a choice procedure formu-
lated in the language of choice by game trees and argue that this procedure is observa-
tionally equivalent to shortlisting. These observational equivalences point out the con-
nection between list rationality and shortlisting that does not directly follow from their
formulations.
14Shortlisting is even more restrictive than the two-stage choice procedure, in which both binary rela-
tions are required to be asymmetric and acyclic. See Example 1 of Dutta and Horan (2013)
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Example 4 (Choice by a Stackelberg game). The primitive of this choice procedure is
a Stackelberg game, an extensive form game with two players{a leader with a prefer-
ence relation 1 and a follower with a preference relation 2. First, the leader chooses
an action from his action space A1. Then, informed of the leader’s choice, the follower
chooses an action from his action space A2(a1). Suppose each alternative is the out-
come of a unique joint action of the players. For each choice set S, consider the reduced
extensive form game G|S derived from G by retaining only the paths that lead to termi-
nal nodes having outcomes in S. From each choice set S, the decision maker chooses
the Stackelberg equilibrium15 outcome of the game G|S.
To see that this procedure can be represented as shortlisting, first let P1 = 2. To
define P2, for each x y ∈ X , if both are obtained by the same action of the leader, then
let x P2 y if x 1 y; otherwise let them be incomparable by P2. Now one can easily verify
that a shortlisting procedure with (P1P2) retrieves the same choice function. To see
the converse, consider a shortlisting procedure described by (P1P2). To construct the
game G, let 1 = P2 and 2 be any completion of P1. Next, design A1 and {A2(a1)}a1∈A1
such that if the leader takes an action a1, then the resulting outcomes, depending on
the actions of the follower, coincide with a maximal set of alternatives over which P1 is
complete.16 It follows that for each choice set S, the Stackelberg equilibrium outcome
of the game G|S is the max(max(SP1)P2). ♦
To motivate our characterization to follow, consider a shortlisting procedure de-
scribed by (P1P2). Note that if x is preferred to y according to the first binary relation,
then y is never chosen from any choice set that contains x. So we can read x P1 y as x
dominates y. Next consider a list-rational choice procedure described by the list f. Note
that if x is chosen when compared to y and y follows x in the list f, then y is never chosen
from any choice set that contains x. So whenever this is the case, we can conclude that x
dominates y. We illustrate a formal account of this connection by characterizing short-
listing in terms of acyclicity of a binary relation that is similar to the revealed-to-follow
relation.17
Definition 5. For a given choice function c and for each distinct x y ∈ X , x is related
to y, denoted by x Rc y, if for some S ∈, we have
(i) x= c(S ∪ y) and x = c(S), or
(ii) y = c(S ∪ x) and x = c(x y), or
(iii) y = c(S ∪ x) and [y = c(x y) and y = c(S)].
Proposition 2. A choice function c is a shortlisting if and only if Rc is acyclic.
15See Osborne and Rubinstein (1994) for related definitions.
16That is, P1 behaves as a preference relation over each A2(a1). Since P1 is transitive and any transitive
relation can be decomposed into maximal chains, we can construct {A2(a1)}a1∈A1 as described.
17To see the connection between Rc and Fc , note that if x Rci y , then we have x Fc y ; if x R
c
ii y or x R
c
iii y ,
then we have y Fc x.
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In the literature, Au and Kawai (2011), Lleras et al. (2010), and Horan (2012) provide
different characterizations of shortlisting. Among these, the closest to our characteriza-
tion is by Au and Kawai (2011), who require acyclicity of another binary relation. The dif-
ference is that we formulate our Rc relation with a minimal deviation from the revealed-
to-follow relation to facilitate the comparison of shortlisting with list rationality.18 In the
rest of this section we prove Proposition 2.
Lemma 1. For a given choice function c, if Rc is acyclic, then for each S ∈  and x ∈ S, we
have x= c(S) whenever for each y ∈ S \ x, x = c(x y).
Proof. Consider a choice function c such that Rc is acyclic. First we show that for each
S ∈ and distinct x y ∈ S, if x = c(S) and y = c(S \x), then x = c(x y). Call this property
weak path independence (WPI).19 Suppose WPI does not hold. Then it follows that for
some S ∈  and distinct x y ∈ X , we have x = c(S ∪ y) and y = c(S), but y = c(x y).
Since x = c(S ∪ y) and y = c(x y), we have y Rcii x. Since y = c(S ∪ x), and y = c(x y) and
y = c(S), we have x Rciii y. It follows that we have x Rc y Rc x, which contradicts Rc is
acyclic.
Next consider any S ∈  and x ∈ S such that for each y ∈ S \ x, x = c(x y). Now
we show that x = c(S). If S has only two alternatives, then we are done. Suppose S =
{xx1     xn} and consider the choice set {xx1x2}. Note that since x = c(xx1) and
x = c(xx2), it follows from WPI that x= c({xx1x2}). Next, supposing that S has at least
four alternatives, consider the set {xx1x2x3}. Since x = c({xx1x2}) and x= c(xx3),
by WPI we have x= c({xx1x2x3}). By proceeding similarly, we obtain x= c(S). 
Proof of Proposition 2. If part: Suppose c is a shortlisting described by (P1P2). We
will show that Rc is acyclic. To see this, we first show that Rc ⊆ P2. Since P2 is acyclic, it
will follow that Rc is also acyclic.
To show that Rc ⊆ P2, first note that for each x y ∈ X , if x Rci y, then for some S ∈ ,
we have x = c(S ∪ y) and x = c(S). For this case, first we show that y ∈ max(S ∪ yP1). To
see this, since x= c(S∪y), we have x ∈ max(S∪yP1). It follows that we can have x = c(S)
only if there is w ∈ max(SP1) such that w P2 x. Since x = c(S ∪ y), this is possible only if
y P1 w. Suppose there is z ∈ S such that z P1 y. Since P1 is transitive and z P1 y P1 w, we
have z P1 w. So we cannot have w ∈ max(SP1). We obtain a contradiction and it follows
that y ∈ max(S ∪ yP1). Finally, since x= c(S ∪ y), we must have x P2 y.
Next note that for each x y ∈ X , if x Rcii y, then for some S ∈ , we have y = c(S ∪ x)
and x = c(x y). Since x = c(x y), either x P1 y or x P2 y. Since y = c(S ∪ x), we can-
not have x P1 y, so x P2 y. Finally we argue that there is no x y ∈ X such that x Rciii y.
To see this, since y = c(x y), either y P1 x or y P2 x. Since P1 is transitive, we have
max(S ∪ xP1)⊆ max(SP1)∪ x. If y P1 x, then max(S ∪ xP1) = max(SP1), and we get
y = c(S ∪ x). If y P2 x, then y = max(max(SP1)∪ xP2), and it follows that y = c(S ∪ x).
18As a technical difference, our Rc relation is nested by the binary relation that Au and Kawai (2011)
propose. This may facilitate to identify a procedure as shortlisting, since the relation, acyclicity of which is
to be verified, relates fewer alternatives.
19This property is formulated in Yildiz (2013) to give an alternative characterization of list-rational choice
functions.
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Only-if part: Let P2 be any completion of the transitive closure of Rc . Let P1 =
{(x y)|y P2 x and x= c(x y)}. Since Rc is acyclic, P2 is a preference relation.
Next we show that P1 is transitive. Considering any x y z ∈ X such that x P1 y P1 z,
we show that x P1 z. It follows from the construction of P1 that z P2 y P2 x. Since P2
is transitive, we have z P2 x. Now we argue that x = c(x z). First, we show that x =
c(x y z). By contradiction, first suppose y = c(x y z). Since x P1 y, we have x = c(x y),
so we get x Rcii y. This contradicts y P2 x. Next suppose z = c(x y z). Since y P1 z, we
have y = c(y z). It follows that y Rcii z. This contradicts z P2 y. Hence, we obtain x =
c(x y z). Since y P2 x, we cannot have x Rci y. Since x = c(x y z), we must have x =
c(x z); otherwise we have x Rci y. Since x = c(x z), either x P1 z or x P2 z. Since z P2 x,
we have x P1 y. Hence, we conclude that P1 is transitive.
Finally, for each S ∈ such that x= c(S), we show that x= max(max(SP1)P2). First
we show that x ∈ max(SP1). By contradiction, suppose there is y ∈ S such that y P1 x. It
follows from the construction of P1 that x P2 y and y = c(x y). However, since x = c(S)
and y = c(x y), we have y Rcii x. This contradicts x P2 y.
Next, we show that there is no y ∈ max(SP1) such that y P2 x. By contradiction,
suppose there is such an alternative y. Since y = c(S), by Lemma 1, there exists z1 ∈ S
such that z1 = c(y z1). Since x = c(S), if x = c(S \ z1), then we have x Rci z1. If x =
c(S \ z1), by the same reasoning, there exists z2 ∈ (S \ z1) such that z2 = c(y z2). Since
S is finite, by proceeding similarly we find z ∈ S such that x Rci z and z = c(y z). Since
P2 is transitive and y P2 x P2 z, we have y P2 z. Since z = c(y z), we obtain z P1 y. This
contradicts y ∈ max(SP1). Hence, we obtain x= max(max(SP1)P2). 
5. Conclusion
We analyzed list rationality, which is a natural choice procedure for decision makers
constrained by a single memory cell. We found characterizations of list rationality in
deterministic and stochastic choice setups. These results provide choice theoretic foun-
dations for list rationality and illustrate how to identify unobserved lists from observed
choice behavior. Finally, we offered a connection between list rationality and shortlist-
ing by providing a similar characterization for shortlisting.
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